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Fifth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer
Lecture Series
A Gathering of Legal Scholars to Discuss
"The First Amendment:
A Special Privilege for the Press?"
Foreword: The First Amendment and the
Press
IRWIN P. STOTZKY*
The first amendment occupies an important and unique place
in the history of our republic. It is more than a rule of law; it is an
honored tradition within our society. The words of the first amend-
ment are seen by the courts as "magic words," the touchstone of a
natural law. The first amendment, therefore, has a most positive
aura about it. Everyone wishes to be viewed as favoring the first
amendment's tradition of freedom of speech, press, assembly, peti-
tion, and, by implication, association.' Just what it means to be in
favor of this tradition, however, requires analyses and answers
about which reasonable people may differ.
Justice Cardozo set the stage for our inquiry when he called
freedom of thought and speech (and I would add freedom of the
press, assembly, petition, and association) "the matrix, the indis-
pensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom.' The
central issue posed by this statement is not what "purposes" the
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Freedom of association is not specifically mentioned in the text of the first amend-
ment. It has been judicially recognized, however, as deriving from the rights of speech and
assembly. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
2. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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first amendment serves within our society, for that merely begs the
fundamental question. Rather, the issue is whether freedom of
speech" should be regarded as an end in itself-an expression of
the kind of people we wish to be and the kind of society we wish to
have-or whether freedom of speech should be regarded merely as
a means to an end such as self-government or the discovery and
dissemination of "objective" truth. Thus, any concept of freedom
of speech must begin by discussing the implications of Justice Car-
dozo's statement.
Philosophers, legal commentators, Justices of the Supreme
Court, and other judges have relied on three basic paradigms or
models of the first amendment. These models, in turn, constitute
the theoretical bases upon which first amendment protections are
built.
The first and most common theory of free speech-the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" paradigm-offers little more than an instrumen-
tal role for the first amendment. Proponents of this model claim
that truth (with a capital 7) or the most illuminating perspective
or solution can be discovered through the process of debate, free
from any kind of governmental interference. The model has strong
historical support. The classic statement of this model was articu-
lated first by John Milton' and later by John Stuart Mill. Justice
Holmes gave judicial support for this view of the first amendment
in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States:6
3. In this foreword, I use the term "freedom of speech" to represent the first amend-
ment freedoms of press, assembly, petition, and association. I do not include freedom of
religion within this category.
4. J. MILroN, Areopagitica, in AzoPAGITCA AND OTHER PROSE WRITINGS BY JOHN
MILTON (W. Hailer ed. 1927). E.g., even "bad books. .. to a discreet and judicious reader
serve in many respects to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate.... [AJII opin-
ions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and assistance toward the
speedy attainment of what is truest." Id. at 19-20. More graphically:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so
truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt
her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter?
Id. at 59.
5. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 135-36 (M.
Cowling ed. 1968):
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing
the human race .... If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportu-
nity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error.
6. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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FOREWORD
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
The Supreme Court continues to rely primarily on the "market-
place of ideas" paradigm in determining what speech is protected
under the first amendment.
7
Yet critics of this model claim that, for several reasons, it fails
to meet its goal: the discovery of "objective" truth. First, the critics
claim that truth is not and cannot ever be objective; second, they
claim that the market analogy fails because of monopoly control of
the media. These points, coupled with the fact that many groups
lack any access to the media, make the "marketplace of ideas"
model less than a complete explanation of free speech.
The second theory of free speech-the "self-government"
model-views free speech as an essential element of self-govern-
ment in a democratic society, through which real freedom is de-
fined, realized, and secured.8 Under this theory, freedom of speech
is vital for effective political participation. Freedom of speech
makes it possible to publicize and hence root out violations of
other rights against the "people." Without such freedom, the gov-
ernment could simply silence those whose rights it invaded. Propo-
nents of the "self-government" theory, most notably Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn,9 would narrow the protection of speech to
public discourse on issues of civic importance. This island of dis-
course would be absolutely protected; everything outside the island
would receive only minimal due process protection. Critics contend
that the category of absolute protection is much too narrow and
must therefore be expanded to include information, however indi-
rect, that would help the citizen make informed choices about pub-
lic issues. Even with expanded protection, however, the question
would remain why participation in government should be valued.
7. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
271.72 & n.13, 279 n.19 (1964).
8. Cf. Lewis, Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize Government: Toward a First
Amendment Theory of Accountability, 34 U. MIAMi L. REv. 793 (1980) (to achieve success
of a self-governing democracy there must be accountability through an informed public).
9. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONS TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
1980]
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One response has been the third model of free speech: the para-
digm of "personhood."
Proponents of this theory 10 see freedom of speech as the nec-
essary context for any meaningful concept of liberty, not in the
instrumental sense of the two other models, but in the constitutive
sense that a society of silenced but "otherwise free" persons is un-
thinkable outside a religious retreat. Freedom of speech is seen as
-an end in itself-as a constitutive part of personal autonomy and
as a basis for self-fulfillment." Critics of the "personhood" para-
digm argue, however, that this model is too constricted in its
vision, because it ignores the necessity of freedom of speech for
any properly functioning democracy.
Thus, each model of freedom of speech is open to some form
of criticism. Yet any satisfactory theory of free speech must come
.to terms with the implications of each of these models. More im-
portantly, any -satisfactory theory of free speech must draw upon
the underlying theories of each model. Similarly, any satisfactory
view of the role of the press must rest on an analysis of just what
the first amendment stands for in our society. Indeed, much of the
recent controversy about the role of the press can be traced di-
rectly to a failure to analyze properly the values undergirding the
first amendment's tradition of freedom of speech and press.
Recent encounters between the press and the courts have not
gone well for first amendment claims. The courts have limited the
press not only in its access to newsgathering, but also in its ability
to distribute what it obtains.1' For example, the courts have con-
tracted the definition of a public figure and exposed publications
to large liabilities for minimal inaccuracies that were scarcely care-
less; 8 allowed searches of news premises based on a warrant for
"mere evidence" of someone else's possible crimes;' jailed a re-
porter and levied heavy fines on his employer, the New York
Times, despite his claim of a first amendment privilege not to di-
vulge confidential sources sought by a criminal defendant; 5 upheld
the exclusion of media representatives from a county jail;"' and
10. See, e.g., Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972).
11. See Comment, 34 U. MIAmi L. REv. 1043 (1980).
12. The Court has similarly limited the broadcast media in their ability to disseminate
information. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
13. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
14. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
15. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
16. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
[Vol. 34:785
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barred the press from courtroom access in a pretrial hearing." The
work product of the courts concerning these and other first amend-
ment claims has been variously labeled by the press and other
commentators as a "disaster," a relentless "assault" on the press,
and a "dismantling" of the first amendment. 8 The Fifth Annual
Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, therefore, is both timely
and significant, since the distinguished participants have addressed
questions central to this first amendment controversy. And given
the prominence of the speakers and the wide variations in their
views, the debate has proved to be quite lively.
The basic issue addressed by the authors is whether the press
should enjoy special protection under the first amendment. This
issue, in turn, requires analysis of two separate but intertwined
questions. First, whether the press clause of the first amendment
provides protection for the press that is independent from the pro-
tection provided others under the speech clause. Second, whether
the press requires special constitutional protection because of the
role it plays as a watchdog on government-as a fourth institution
outside the government that serves as an additional check on the
three official branches.1
e
The authors discuss these issues through an analysis of access
claims to governmental information. More specifically, they ad-
dress the theoretical difficulties of deciding when the first amend-
ment entitles the press and the public to obtain information the
government seeks to withhold.
During the 1970's, the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected
claims of either a special press right of access or a general public
right of access to information the government was unwilling to re-
lease.20 In 1980, however, the Supreme Court endorsed an access
17. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Reston, Courts and the Press, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1979, § 1 at 31, col. 6;
id. at 20, col. 1; id. April 23, 1979, § 4 at 9, col. 3.
19. See Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 819 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1 (1978). Even the Justice most likely to recognize the special status of the "fourth
estate" under the press clause, Justice Stewart, implied that the government could deny
access to information as well as punish its theft. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848-49 (1965). To Stewart, the press clause merely barred the govern-
ment from prohibiting or punishing the publication of information once the press obtained
it. More significantly, the only support on the Court for right of access claims came from
those Justices who relied more generally on first amendment principles rather than on the
press clause. See Justice Powell's dissenting opinions in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 861-64 (1974), and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974).
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claim to criminal trials by a vote of seven to one. 1 In Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,"2 the Court held that the right of the
press and the public to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the first amendment.
The Richmond decision is significant because it is the first
case in which a majority of the Supreme Court found that the first
amendment protects a right of access of the press and the public to
information the government is unwilling to release. As such, Rich-
mond becomes the focal point for debate on the scope of any fu-
ture access claims. Speculations about the scope of any right of
access of the press or the public to information the government
seeks to withhold are made tenuous, however, by the limited na-
ture of the decision.
The decision is limited in several ways. First, the case reached
the Supreme Court on a very narrow issue: "[W]hether a criminal
trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request
of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required
to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that
some other overriding consideration requires closure."' 8 Second,
the holding was similarly limited. The Court held that "[aibsent
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public.' 4 Finally, and perhaps most sig-
nificantly, the Richmond decision addressed a very specific factual
setting.
In Richmond, the trial judge granted a defendant's motion to
close to the public his fourth trial on a murder charge.25 Although
neither the prosecutor nor the two reporters then present in the
courtroom objected to the motion, the trial court later granted
their newspaper's request for a hearing on a motion to vacate the
closure order. After the hearing, the judge denied the motion but
made no findings in support of his conclusion that closure was ap-
propriate. Furthermore, the judge did not inquire about possible
alternative solutions to ensure a fair trial and did not recognize
any constitutional right of the press or the public to attend the
21. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
22. See For further analysis of the Richmond decision, see 34 U. MIAMi L. REv. 937
(1980).
23. 100 S. Ct. at 2821.
24. Id. at 2830.
25. In granting the closure motion, the trial judge presumably relied on VA. CODE §
19.2-266 (1950), which provided that in all criminal trials "the court may, in its discretion,
exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial,




On these facts, the Supreme Court found a public and press
right to attend criminal trials. The case does not mean that the
first amendment rights of the press and the public to attend crimi-
nal trials are absolute. On the contrary, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion makes it perfectly clear that access to criminal trials may
be limited in some circumstances.2 7 If access may sometimes be
limited in such a context as that in Richmond, it is difficult even to
speculate about access claims in other settings. And the Justices'
opinions offer little help.
Not surprisingly, the Justices focused on somewhat different
first amendment theories. Although all of the Justices except Jus-
tice Rehnquist reached the same conclusion, they traveled by dif-
ferent routes. One group of Justices (Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices White and Stevens) stressed the importance of public access
to a criminal trial to ensure its fundamental fairness and "proper
functioning."2 8 Second, Justices Brennan and Marshall supported
access to criminal trials to ensure the availability of information
necessary for informed public debate.29 Finally, Justices Stewart
and Blackmun found both of these lines of reasoning to be signifi-
26. The next day, the court granted the defendant's motion to strike the prosecution's
evidence, excused the jury, and found the defendant not guilty. 100 S. Ct. at 2820.
27. Id. at 2830 n.18. There is no indication that the concurring Justices would disagree
with Chief Justice Burger's position. On the contrary, even Justice Brennan claimed that in
some circumstances it would be appropriate to close portions of the trial. He referred specif-
ically to trials involving national security issues. 100 S. Ct. at 2839 n.24.
28. Id. at 2825-28. Chief Justice Burger's opinion tells us very little about future access
claims. He makes little attempt to explain the constitutional underpinnings of an access
right.
29. Id. at 2832-39. Justice Brennan's opinion is the only one in Richmond that attempts
to create a theoretical basis for access claims. To Brennan, "the First Amendment embodies
more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for their own
sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government." Id. at 2833 (emphasis in original). But since all expression may be relevant
information for individual development, and therefore input into government, the first
amendment must distinguish the relevant information for the structural role it plays. If not,
the stretch of the protection would be theoretically limitless. Justice Brennan therefore sug-
gests that access must be open for information that will allow democracy to be meaningful.
That, in turn, depends on "whether access to a particular government process is important
in terms of that very process." Id. at 2834. Finally, "the case for a right of access has special
force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular pro-
ceedings or information." Id.
Yet Justice Brennan's analysis still leaves one wondering what particular values will
help in differentiating among relevant kinds of information. Likewise, it fails to answer why
self-development or the search for "truth" are not relevant values or, if they are, how and
when one should employ them in any particular situation.
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cant.8 0 Furthermore, the Richmond decision is based on and lim-
ited by each of the Justices' views of the historic role and institu-
tional purposes of public trials. Thus, the Court found only a
limited right of access in a specific circumstance.
Given all of this, the contours of a right of access to informa-
tion the government seeks to withhold remain uncertain. After
Richmond, the question remains: To. what extent does the right of
access extend beyond criminal trials to other governmental infor-
mation? Because Richmond was decided after the articles went to
press, each of the articles in the Symposium should be read in light
of this question. In addition, each of the authors has a somewhat
different view of the first amendment. As you read their articles,
you might ask what the limits of access claims would be under
each of their theories.
30. Id. at 2839-43.
[Vol. 34:785
